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T I M E  T R A V E L  A N D  T H E O R I E S  O F  T I M E
The intuitive outlook of the world is seriously threatened by many advances in
modern sciences. The situation was quite different one hundred years ago. The
common-sense view of the world was not at odds with the scientific theory until the
last decades of the nineteenth century. Mechanics and phenomenological
thermodynamics were almost intuitive in Western thought. After the first
developments of statistical thermodynamics and electromagnetism and especially
following the discovery of General Theory of Relativity (GTR) and Quantum
Mechanics (QM) a disagreement arose between our intuitions about the structure of
the world and the scientific descriptions of it. The existence of new scientific models
questioned our ability to understand reality and our comprehension of understanding
reality. But which one is the most correct: our everyday intuitions which are relatively
stable and almost universally endorsed or scientific explanations of the world which
are continually changing? From the beginning QM and GTR were beset by problems
of their foundations so that there are many interpretations of them. The situation did
not change too much in the meantime: QM raises problems of measurement and
non-locality and GTR the problem of spacetime singularities and acausality, which are
mainly due to the fracture between common sense thought and scientific models.1
This should be one of the most important tasks of philosophy today: to explain and to
analyse the concurrence and the divergence between our intuitions and scientific
models.
But there are some Gedankenexperimente that trouble our minds and equally the
sciences. They can be considered as belonging to a third place apart from everyday
intuitions and scientific explanations, a „no man’s land”. Initially both everyday
thinking and scientific outlook rejected, although with completely different
arguments, such fancy devices as the products of mere imagination. One of these is
so-called time travel or, in the scientific language of GTR, closed timelike curves
(CTC). The two concepts are connected and the border line between them is vague.
The phrase „time travel” comes from science fiction, but in fact philosophical and
logical ideas are involved. The concept of CTC was used in connection with Gödel’s
solutions to Einstein’s field equations (EFE) for a particular configuration of matter
distribution in the universe. While CTC is a very technical term used only by a few
scientists, the more intuitive idea of time travel is ubiquitous in literature, movies and
TV series. Although few people grasp the meaning of CTC actualisation in our
universe, anyone understands that if time travel were possible, all our models of
physical reality, biological evolution, human history and life in the universe would be
radically revised. Common thinking and scientific theory acknowledge that if we are
to accept time travel or CTC (in our Universe) the grounds of our knowledge must be
somehow revised and concepts as „infinity”, „law of nature”, „evolution”,
„knowledge”, etc. should be reshaped.
Like QM and GTR, discussions of time travel and CTC are a contested territory
for science, philosophy and common-sense thinking. We will follow in this paper
some of the arguments of philosophers and scientists and we will discuss some
notions used in the discussion. All these are in themselves already committed to a
peculiar metaphysics of time that shall be revealed gradually.
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So this puzzle can be approached in two different ways. Time travel can be
described without using the formalisms of modern physics, but just a minimal logical
apparatus and philosophical speculations regarding identity in time, nature of time,
temporal parts, existence and becoming. It is well described in certain terms of
semantics and analytical ontology. Analytical philosophy argues that the problems of
time travel can be solved in a conceptual and linguistic frame using only the informal
arguments of philosophy. Some philosophers don’t employ GTR formalisation
because it’s too counter-intuitive and somehow relative to a system of
presuppositions2 or grammar3 and they think that philosophical argument itself is
enough to illuminate or even settle this question.
For philosophers of science and scientists this speculative approach to time travel
is derided as „armchair philosophical reflections”.4 They use topology and GTR to
define spacetime singularities and CTC. In John Earman’s words, scientists require
time travel (a) to be compatible with the laws of physics, (b) to not imply backward
causation and (c) to not be open to a rereading on which no time travel takes place.
Science is not primarily concerned with logical contradictions, as (a) would secure
this; neither with the counter-intuitive aspects of time travel, as relativity is at odd
with our common ideas of „space” and „time” so nobody expects an intuitive idea of
time travel.5 The main problem for the scientific approach to time travel is to maintain
the laws of physics, and these demands will solve the problems like autoinfanticide
and other logical paradoxes. A scientific discussion on CTC should begin not with
fiction and counterfactual conjectures, but with the solutions to Einstein’s Field
Equation (EFE).6
In the last fifty years there were many interpretations to so-called time travel
coming from both directions. Each approach hopes to solve the problem with
independent tools: philosophy suggests that only the logical and conceptual
constraints should limit and should determine the possibility of time travel while the
scientific approach compels the time travel to those models that are compatible with
the laws of nature. The differences are so important that in John Earman’s opinion
there are different types of time travel.7
The first two sections will outline two types of time travel, mainly distinguished
by these the approaching methods: the philosophical and the scientific one. Sections
3), 4) and 5) will present the arguments for and against the possibility and the
probability of time travel. In section 6) we will describe two theories of time currently
on debate and in section 7) we will try to show that time travel is a serious challenge
for both of them and an improvement is necessary.
                                                
2 For Putnam, necessary truths are relative to a body of knowledge. He takes time travel as an example. So
that the alleged logical impossibilities are due to our normal use of language and of terms like „existing” in time
and space, „travelling” along world-lines, etc. If we start to speak on time travel things go wrong in countless
ways. But we can freely choose a mathematical description of the phenomena. The problem of time travel isn’t a
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methods of STR in his account of time travel, without solving the problem of integrating time travel into a physical
theory. [Weingard, 1972, 118].
3 #Rom Harre#
4 [Earman, 1995a, p. 194].
5 [Earman, 1995a, 125].
6 In Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. by M. Schilpp, 1949.
7 [Earman, 1995a, p. 163].
31) Wellsian time travel
The term first appeared in the novel The Time Machine by H. G. Wells (1898). It
was discussed in the analytical philosophy and logic of the last forty years and mainly
rejected because it implies such strange oddities as materialisation and
dematerialisation, as well as ubiquity and backward causation, but not necessarly the
violation of energy conservation or other laws of physics. The simplest scheme of this
time travel presupposes that we have an object M (typically the time machine and its
occupant) that can appear ex nihilo and can disappear ad nihilum. The evolution of M
can be represented on a section of 4-D manifold (x,y,z,t) in which space is confined to
a single variable. To understand better the time travel argument, it’s useful to bring to
light the difference between time (t) inside M and time (T) outside it, namely the
difference between private time (internal time) and public time (external time).8
There are at least three types of time travel in the wellsian meaning, depending on
when and where appears the fracture in the spacetime evolution of time machine. The
vertical axis is time, the horizontal one is space or a transformation of spatial
ordinates blended together in a single variable (see Fig. 1).
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Figure 1
I) In the first case M disappears at b and reappears at c, having a normal evolution
on a-b and c-d intervals, but with a jump from b to c because between b and c it
doesn’t exist at all. This can be interpreted as a „gap” in the existence of the machine.
In this gap of existence we can say that ∆SM = 0 (entropy variation between two states
of M)9 and also ∆t=0.
II) In the second case M traverses the period b-c without disappearing. From the
outside, all the processes in M are going backward in time. While inside of M nothing
strange happens, the outside world seen from inside is going backward in time. The
main feature and the most embarrassing is the decreasing entropy in M. If the filmed
picture of M is played backward then the events in it are all normal. This is a reason
                                                
8 [Lewis, 1986b, 69]. It can be proved that difference between public and proper time can restore the
consistency of time travel, but cannot solve the problem of simultaneity [Faye, 1989, 234]. This is as an import
from the Theory of Relativity, but not an essential one, as the difference between times and spaces of systems of
references was known before Newton.
9 It’s worth noting again that the use of entropy does not bestow a theoretical flavour to this approach and it
is somehow counterfeit.
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for supposing that time inside the machine in going backward only if we admit further
metaphysical assumption: that the direction of time is determined by the direction of
increasing entropy, although this is an hypothesis that can be refuted or qualified and
it holds only in a certain view of time that infers the direction of time from the
entropy. As we can consider the time machine an isolated system, locally we should
expect an increase in entropy, but this is not the case. In this situation, from
∆SM•∆Suniverse<0 (the entropy inside M flows in other direction that the entropy of the
Universe) we can infer ∆t•∆T<0 (e.g. the two times are flowing in different
directions). The internal time on b-c is backward oriented from future to past. There is
an argument against this inference proposed by Weingard when he criticises the
example given by Putnam based on the entropy arrow of time.10
III) In the third situation M passes into non-existence between b and c, but it
reappears in past, before b. Here we have a combination of I) and II). The entropy of
M between b and c is null, so M is beyond spacetime of the Universe. The time t
doesn’t flow in M; so as ∆SM = 0, therefore ∆t=0 or t doesn’t have any sense.
It is possible to have a fourth situation in which M is evolving very slowly in
time, as in STR and after M is sent off in a very remote area of the universe with a
relativistic speed it returns back and its internal clock will be slowed down. But this
situation is not at all a time travel, as time travel presuppose a move back in time not
only a move forward in time at a different „speed” such a pass over the normal flux of
time.11
The ontological status of M at the moment p is very uncommon in all three
situations. If we accept the classical criterion for existence, in the first and third
situation M doesn’t exist at all, as it doesn’t occupies a spatiotemporal place. In the
second situation we have three M’s, the first (M1) is a physical object evolving
normally in space and time from a toward b; the second one (M2) is moving backward
from b toward c in time and its entropy is decreasing; the third (M3) is a normally
object evolving from c toward d. The internal clock on M2 will show a time before the
time displayed on M1 and after the time of M3, although the external clock shows only
the time of M1. Backward causation can occur at p anywhere, as M2 and M3 are
continuants of M1, but if M1 is in the light-cone of M3 (consider the horizontal
ordinate not at a cosmic magnitude) then it can be influenced by some events in M3, as
M3 should be influenced eventually by some events in M1. In the third situation we
have almost the same situation, but M2 doesn’t exist, so the backward causation is
possible between M3 and M1.12 Reversals of causation are normal in this arrangement,
as they are necessarily involved in time travel.
2) Gödelian time travel
Time travel is closely linked to Einstein Field Equations (EFE), the ground of
GTR. Surprisingly enough, some solutions to EFE which had been given before 1949
supported in some conditions time travel but nobody noticed it13 as the problem of
CTC was overshadowed by the discussions on spacetime singularities. Einstein
                                                
10 [Weingard, 1972, 126-129] and Huw Price, Time’s Arrow & Archimedes’ Point: New Directions for the
Physics of Time, New York Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
11 The above discussion can be found in [Macbeath, 1982, 399].
12 Weinland attempted to integrate the situation II within the laws of physics by assuming that we can have
an antimatter M2 [Weingard, 1972, 122], so in b the machine annihilates himself. This assumption was previously
rejected by Putnam.
13 The solution of Van Stockum (1937) of a infinite rotating cylinder of dust, reanalysed by Tipler in 1974
for the finite case contains CTC.
5himself had a strange attitude regarding the singularities in EFE and he never accepted
them totally.14 In 1949 the first solutions to EFE permitting CTC were provided by
Gödel. Concerning CTC, Einstein suggested that they can be further analysed and he
didn’t reject them.15 Einstein asked himself if such cosmological solutions allowing
time travel „are not to be excluded on physical grounds”. That was the beginning of
the scientific approach to time travel via the analysis of universes accepting CTC.
Chandrasekhar and Wright had questioned them in a paper in 195316 and after that the
problem was treated implicitly as a sneaky physical dilemma in GTR. The classical
textbooks on General Relativity till ‘90’s scarcely mention CTC and avoid any
discussion on it.
Gödel introduces a transformation of Minkowski linear coordinates to cylindrical
coordinates.17 By this transformation the time becomes circular and the world is
recursive as we haven’t a single time slice in this universe and we cannot speak of this
universe at a single time and as a consequence an object has no temporal parts in this
Gödelian universe, and the structure of time is „closed”. A spacetime manifold that
include non global CTCs cannot be globally foliated, i.e. sliced in spacelike surfaces
that can be regarded as successive nows.18
We can define a condition for the existence of CTC by a topological condition on
the light cone. A timelike close curve19 doesn’t exist in a Minkowski spacetime. We
define p<<q as a relation connecting two points if there is a non-trivial timelike
future-directed curve from p to q, which means that p can be causally connected with
q. The sets I+(p)={x|p << x} and I–(p)={y|y << p} are the future-set respectively the
past-set of the point p. There exists a CTC crossing p if p∈I+(p). The most important
feature of CTC is that they are continuous and we can preserve the criterion of
individuality. On a CTC there are not dematerialisation or materialisation as in
Wellsian time travel. In a Gödel universe each point contains at least one CTC.
Gödel transformations can be rejected on various basis, but the problem is that
CTC can appear in a variety of matter distributions described by classical GTR where
matter distorts the geodesics so strongly that CTC could occur. For this reason the
scientists are divided. First are those who impose a chronology condition („there is no
CTC in the time-oriented spacetime”) in the Penrose-Hawking theorems regarding
singularities (the most important result in GTR) and believe that GTR has the
resources to show that chronology violations have to be kept (some reason should be
that if CTC were not present from the beginning they would not occur later and a
initial state with CTC was not reasonable). Second, there are those who take seriously
                                                
14 P. Bergmann in H. Woolf (ed.), Some Strangeness in the Proportion, MA, Addison Wesley, 1980, p. 156.
He believed till the end of his life that Unified Theory will arise no singularities. He pronounced this possibility
repugnant to his physical intuition: „Dies widerstrebt meinem physikalishen Gefühl aufs lebthaftteste”, in
[Earman, 1995a, 26].
15 But as Earman proves the CTC and singularities are not separate problems [Earman, 1995a].
16 The aversion to CTC was removed by Howard Stein in [Stein, 1970].
17 K. Gödel „An example of a New Type of Cosmological Solutions to Einstein’s Field Equations of
Gravitation”, Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 21, nr. 3, July 1949, 447-450 reprinted in Albert Einstein:
Philosopher-Scientist, ed. by P. A. Schilpp, 1949.
18 [King, 1999, 276n7].
19 Given a Minkowski spacetime, a line element is ds2 = dt2–dx2–dy2–dz2 and in a general tensorial form:
ds2=ηab dxa dxb. Unlike the Newtonian space, the line element can be negative also or null. A curve between two
points having a positive length is a timelike curve if its length (by integration of the line elements) is positive, a
spacelike if its length is negative and a null curve or a light curve if its length is zero. The light cone is a double
cone formed by all the null curves (straight lines here) passing by the origin. All timelike curves are inside the
cone and the spacelike ones outside it.
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the violation of chronology condition, some of the most firm being K. Thorne, J.
Friedman, I. Novikov.
3) Arguing against wellsian time travel
Why was time travel rejected by philosophers? It is clear that the story of a
machine going forward and backward in time put in jeopardy some of our classical
views of reality because it infringes our idea that there is a fundamental „distinctness”
between past and future. But a question raises: is time travel nothing but a thought
experiment or a subject of science-fiction? I think that it is also a challenge to our
system of representing time and space and it can be used as a tool to inspect and verify
our models of reality and that the analysis of time travel improves our understanding
of the spacetime structure of the universe.
Firstly, time travel is against our intuition of time as a single line without any
break or branching point. We’re very familiar with the isomorphism between time
order and real number set. We cannot accept that a number should be greater and in
the same time smaller than another one. In this respect it is very appropriate to quote
Swinburne’ argument against time travel: „If the present instant t1 will return then the
next instant subsequent to this one, t2, will be both before and after t1”.20 This seems
to be a logical argument against all types of time travel, Gödelian or Wellsian as well.
Or, in other words „a certain event corresponding to a single point in which the
corresponding world line recrosses itself would be simultaneous with a remote future
instants.”21 So if t1< t2< t1 is an impossibility, then time travel is impossible. L. Dwyer
tried to reject Swinburne’s assumption on the basis that it presuppose that t1 occurs
twice and this is a fault similar of postulating a hypertime, although this is not
necessarily true.22
Secondly, time travel is against our common-sense belief that a thing is occupying
a single place at a moment and it cannot be in two place at the same time. This a
problem concerning identity of objects in space and time. At the moment p in the
second situation described in Figure 1 we have three objects numerically identical. As
J. Faye argues against time travel, our concept of an object involves it havimg a
spatially finite and bounded extension. If a thing is separated from another and there is
no connection between them, then they are eo ipso different objects. The spatial
boundedness makes them countable and numerically different.23 In Faye’ opinion, to
maintain the uniformity of laws governing the perceptual access to the world around
the traveller and his younger replica (the person he should have meet in the past) is
impossible, so we cannot retain the relation of simultaneity of time traveller.24 So this
should be an argument against time travel based on identity and simultaneity.
Thirdly, time travel involves changing the past. From this derives the grandfather
paradox and auto-infanticide discussed by Lewis. This is considered by some
philosophers the major hindrance to accept time travel. Backward causation can occur
if we accept that the past can be changed. In his causal theory of time, Reichenbach
uses as axioms that „the past never comes back” and „we cannot change the past, but
                                                
20 R. Swinburne, Space and Time, Macmillan, 1968, p. 169.
21 M. Capek, „Time in Relativity Theory: Arguments for a Philosophy of Becoming” in J. T. Fraser (ed.) The
Voices of Time, G. Brazziler, NY, 1966, 448.
22 [Dwyer, 1975, 347].
23 [Faye, 1989, 230].
24 [Faye, 1989, 234].
7we can change the future”.25 This helps him to define time in terms of causality. If the
past would came back, we should have a closed causal chain. The same situation
would be if the past would be changed. The causal chain does not merely happen to be
missing, „but is physically impossible”.26 But Reichenbach doesn’t reject the self-
encounter of a younger ego, a situation paradoxical to us from a physical point of
view, but not logically impossible. In a situation with a self-encounter ego, there will
be no time order in the usual sense.27 In the same manner, Stephen Hawking and
George Ellis tried to prove on a logical basis that time travel is impossible.28 The
method used by the two cosmologists is reductio-ad-absurdum. The four premises
used are: 1. A time traveller exists prior to carrying out the time travel. 2. All physical
objects have continuous existences. 3. Time travel to the past is logically possible. 4.
Travelling „backwards” in time would enable a time traveller to stop him/herself from
embarking to his/her time journey. The only premise that can be false is the third one.
As Smart remarked29 we can accept or reject time travel merely on a semantical
ground by making conceptual analysis of time and space. Space has two meanings:
space is a continuant, it is like an object, it has some properties as „being occupied by
X” or „being curved”. The main feature of it is that it can change or stay the same. In
the second sense space is described mathematically and it is tenseless and it is not a
continuant. So, the Minkowski theory of space-time engaged this sense of space. We
are speaking about time travel in the continuant sense of space. A travel in space-time
of an object O from point A to point B means that the worldlines of O intersects the
world lines of A and B. In this representation, as Schlick remarked, „time is already
represented within the model and cannot be introduced again from outside”.30 So, in a
pure four-dimensional language of world-lines the motion in an ordinary way of
changing time and space ordinates doesn’t exist. We cannot speak of travelling in time
and in space and we cannot represent motion in four-dimensional space-time. The
possibility or the impossibility of time travel resides in the meaning given to this
concept, like in Putnam’s interpretation. In discussing his argument, Smart shows that
we can interpret a relativistic journey as time travel to the  future, as I can shot myself
from earth to a very remote part of the universe and when I come back I will find my
contemporaries very old, as to say they were futurised in the meantime. This is a
well-known consequence of The Special Theory of Relativity. Smart accepts the
conceptual possibility of time travel if we define properly time, space and motion, but
he cannot accept time travel as moving in a four-dimensional spacetime.
4) Arguing for and against CTC
A good example of how time travel can be rejected using not pure logical
speculation, but instead EFE and details about the structure of spacetime is the
well-known conjecture against time travel, a standard formulation of which was given
by Stephen Hawking, namely the Chronology Protection Conjecture (CPC).31 This is
a principle requiring that the laws of physics prevent the appearance of CTC and
generally it is thought as being ad-hoc. Hawking used it against time travel. He denied
                                                
25 Direction of Time, University of California Press, 1956, p. 22-24.
26 Idem, p. 39.
27 Ibidem, p. 37.
28 [Hawking & Ellis, 1973, 189].
29 „Spatialising Time”, Mind, 64 (1955), pp. 239-241.
30 M. Schlick, Philosophy of Nature, New York, Philosophical Library, 1949, p. 43.
31 [Hawking, 1992].
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we should resolve the paradox just by conjecturing that in a universe where CTC are
possible there are some changes in the free will of the time traveller. But „this will not
be necessary if what I call the chronology protection conjecture is correct”.
As Kim and Thorne had previously shown32, a sort of time machine can be
conceived using a non-trivial topology involving wormholes. Hawking proves that in
order to create a wormhole one has to distort the metric so much that closed timelike
curves appear. The mathematical result of Hawking is that „If there is a timelike tube
T connecting surfaces S and S’ of different topology, then the region MT contains
closed timelike curves.”33 (here S and S’ are spacelike surface without boundaries, S’
being the result of warping the surface developing from S and having a different
topology, saying with a wormhole or a handle, and MT is region of spacetime bounded
by T, S and S’). But how this can be prevented? There is a constant (B) which
depends on the quantum state and spin of the field. If B is negative the
energy-momentum tensor will have a repulsive gravitational effect in the equation for
the rate of change of the volume. „This will tend to prevent the spacetime from
developing a Cauchy horizon. If B is negative spacetime will resist being warped so
that closed timelike curves appear. If B is positive, „the gravitational effect would be
attractive, and the spacetime would develop a singularity, which would prevent one
reaching a region of closed timelike curves”. Either way, with B having all possible
values, Hawking considers that there are theoretical reasons to believe CPC by the fact
that laws of physics prevent the appearance of CTC. The experimental evidence is that
„we have not been invaded by hordes of tourists from the future”.34
But Hawking’s argument against CTC is not very convincing, as J. Earman
recently argued. He thinks that time travel is possible but a time machine cannot be
operated. A time machine in a weak sense does not produce a CTC but reveals it. A
time machine in a strong sense brings about a CTC.35 The chronology protection
theorem (CPT) is one of the most important results connected with GTR: the idea is to
analyse very carefully the time machine (in a strong sense) and to prove that if we
accept it we have to run afoul of some plausible physical constraints. CPT tries to
reach impossible results starting from the acceptance of time machines. It is like a
reductio ad absurdum.
Earman proved that we haven’t yet a strong argument to undermine the possibility
of a „strong” time machine. We will not enter here into technical aspects of CPT, but
we have to mention Earman’s idea of constructing a CTC on a hypersurface Σ without
edge such that there is no CTC in the J–(Σ) (the causal past of Σ). Then he discusses
two CPTs, Hawking’s and Tipler’s, all settled within classical GTR. However CPTs
do not suffice to reject time machines in a strong sense but merely make them very
difficult to operate.
The last discussions in Earman’ paper are very interesting, as he speculates about
Quantum Field Theory (QFT). On one hand QFT can help time machine by
countenancing matter that violates the weak energy condition. On the other hand there
are at least three ways in which QFT militates against time travel and we can expect
that QFT will wreck the dream of operating a time machine, but we haven’t yet a
viable QFT. In this situation none of the CPT in the frame of classical GTR can offer
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33 [Hawking, 1992, 609].
34 [Hawking, 1992, 610].
35 [Earman, 1995b, 126].
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the best version of cosmic censorship.36 To conclude, dismissing CTC out of hand is a
practice which reminds us of the dogmatism about singularities in GTR prior to the
singularity theorems or worse, about dogmatism against STR or QM before their first
experimental confirmations.
5) Between being improbable and being impossible
The best known argument for accepting time travel not as logically impossible,
but merely an oddity for our intuition, is due to David Lewis. A possible world in
which time travel took place would have be a strange one: this puzzle comes from the
paradox of changing the past. The time traveller cannot change his past. P. Riggs calls
this argument „the Principal Paradox of Time Travel”. He gives ten assumptions of
Lewis’ argument:37 (i) Time is only one-dimensional (although Lewis does not reject
two dimensional time). (ii) Propositions about past events are either tenselessly true or
tenselessly false. (iii) The occurrence of any contradictory circumstance is impossible.
(iv) Human beings do have (at least) limited freedom of action. (v) Events could have
been otherwise than what they are, have, or will be. (vi) Tim is not created ex-nihilo
(in Lewis argument, Tim is a time traveller who goes back fifty years to kill his own
grandfather) (vii) Tim is a normal, adult human being whose bodily functions,
reflexes, memory, etc., are not impaired in any way by his travelling in time. (viii)
Tim’s intent and determination to kill his grandfather is unaffected by his travelling in
time; (ix) Tim actually shoots at his natural grandfather and not a person he
mistakenly believes to be his natural grandfather; (x) Tim does not „pass into” another
universe inhabited by similar individuals to those in his universe.38 Lewis argues that
you cannot change your past because if something can happen than its happening is
compossible with certain facts. Tom can kill his Grandfather, but his killing
Grandfather is not compossible with a more inclusive set of facts, especially what
Grandfather was doing after Tim’s return in past.39 Tim wants to kill his Grandfather
and can do it. But as he tries to kill him, appears a set of circumstances disallowing
his desire. This failure is not due to any lack of capacities of Tim, or of an
opportunity. Lewis states the „obvious, but readily overlooked explanation, that
people often fail to reach goals that usually are well within their ability to achieve.”40
Horwich has another explanation for time travel. He diverges the discussion about
time travel from possibility to probability and he asks himself about the real
probability and epistemological possibility of time travel. The closed causal chains are
double causal relations in which c causes e and e causes c*. We can imagine the
situation in which c and c* are mutually exclusive. Closed causal chains can produce
bilking arguments, e. g. the hypothesis that in a closed causal loop the initial
environment can be precluded, in other words c* can be lastly the non-existence of c.
Theories implying bilking arguments are: theoretical spacetime of Gödel, Feynman’s
                                                
36 [Earman, 1995b, 137].
37 [Riggs, 1997, 50].
38 It worth noting the different classes of assumptions we have here. The first is a topological claim
concerning the very nature of time. There are some theories of bidimensional time but we’ll not discuss them here.
The second one is about the truth structure of proposition about past and future and it has a semantical
commitment. The third and the fifth are logical assumptions, while the forth concerns the free will of human
beings. The last assumptions are descriptions of facts.
39 [Lewis, 1986a, 79].
40 [Riggs, 1997, 51].
10
idea that positrons are nothing but electrons moving backward in time and the perfect
precognition.41
Horwich proves that time travel is not impossible but highly improbable and he
discusses time travel in Gödelian sense. The occurrence of such circumstances as the
auto-infanticide, etc. will failure and such circumstances are ruled out by what we
know about the world. The conclusion is that closed causal chains deriving from
Gödelian time travel are epistemologically impossible.42 Gödel himself showed that
such structures of space time permitting time travel are technologically impossible
because the energy required would amount to the mass of several galaxies.
Concerning Feynman’ theory, Horwich asks how can we admit that a positron can
be an electron moving backward in time? Let’s mention shortly Berger’s argument for
the Feynman interpretation.43 He starts with an algorithm using an input-output
quantum machine.44 In conformity with Feynman, electrons never travel back in time.
A re-entrant trajectory for a particle means that the input of the quantum machine is
before the output, with ∆t<0. Bohr showed that in QM we have to deal only with
non-re-entrant particles.
We can adopt another microphysical theory in which we have no antiparticles (we
have no positrons as well) and every statement on generation of particles-antiparticles
pairs must be translated into statements about re-entrant particles. We translate all
statements about anti-particles into statements about re-entrant particles. This will
imply some changes in the meaning of „time”. But we have not to confuse the
direction of time with the concept of re-entrance. This is a new concept of Feynman
physics. In pre-Feynman physics, particles could undergo re-entrance, but they did not
do so. In the Feynman model, re-entrance is an axiom, as the velocity of light is
postulated in Special Theory of Relativity. It can be put like this: in physics there is no
law which permits re-entrance in any but a fully conventionalistic manner. But the
acceptance of both entrance and re-entrance will not mean a change of the meaning of
fundamental concepts, but rather the discovery of a new class of physical processes.
Re-entrance should not be decided by the conceptual analysis, but by physics.
In Horwich’s opinion, the empirical bilking argument does not suggest that
Feynmam’s model is epistemologically impossible. His conclusion is that closed
causal chains cannot be dismissed on a priori semantical grounds, nor by an a
posteriori bilking argument, so although the bilking argument isn’t an universal tool
for rejecting closed causal chains, it can discard time travel as highly improbable.
Horwich also defends Gödel’s claim that time travel could occur. He dismisses
the situation of a wellsian travel in time as „there is no physical theory to give it
credence and more difficult, since extra problems to do with personal identity are
involved.”45 He considers four alleged paradoxes of time travel. 1) In gödelian time
travel, M traverses some temporal interval in a time having a different length than the
duration of that interval. This paradox is solved if we accept different frames of
references for time allowed by standard STR.46 2) There is an incompatibility with
                                                
41 Horwich in [Savitt, 1995, 261].
42 Horwich in [Savitt, 1995, 264].
43 [Berger, 1968].
44 R. Feynman, Theory of Fundamental Processes, NY, Benjamin, 1962.
45 [Horwich, 1987, 112], an improved version of „On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel”, Journal of
Philosophy, 1972, 432-444.
46 This was used by D. C. Williams to prove the fault of Wells’ time travel. „The Myth of Passage” in
Journal of Philosophy,  48, pp. 457-472.
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Leibniz’s law that the identical object have all the same properties. This alleged
paradox is ruled out by a language which is time indexical relatively to proper time
and not to general time. 3) The third paradox regards the changing of the past, and
here Horwich insists on the difference between changing the past and influencing it.
The former is indeed impossible, as it is possible with respect to the future. The latter,
however, involves no such contradictions, and this is what is required for time travel.
But Horwich didn’t explicitly define how we can „influence the past”. 4) The fourth
argument concerns autoinfanticide, very similar to Lewis’ one. We are again in the
situation pictured by Lewis, except that Horwich is discussing directly the
autoinfanticide. This is refuted by the restrictions imposed on the class of causal
chains. The idea is to accept that there are constraints on timelike curves that may act
as loci for particular sorts of causal chain. Closed causal chains are subject to
consistency conditions.47
The next move is to accept that bilking arguments involve implausible
coincidences. We can trust that something prevents the bilking and this should be
either the structure of spacetime, or the fact that the individuals who organise trips
into past are not concerned with bilking, either the fact that to close a timelike curve
should need a too great amount of fuel (Gödel’s own explanation), or that quantum
fluctuations should prevent it.48 We can add other reasons to reject time travel. One of
them is the practical impossibility of intentional bilking strategies. Horwich’s
conclusion is that a distribution of circumstances allowing time travel is highly
implausible. Even if we are living in a universe like Gödel’s, it is necessary for the
initial state of a universe with closed timelike lines to possess a certain order. These
special conditions have to conform with a Gödelian spacetime and engender the
entropic behaviour we observe. This should be a small subset of all possible initial
conditions compatible with our entropic data. We cannot conclude that there are no
closed timelike curves. On Horwich’s view, we cannot prove that we are living in a
cylindrical spacetime, but this should be highly improbable.
6) Two theories of time
As we already have seen time travel was firstly rejected by both philosophy and
science, as they tried to prove it was false on various grounds. In the last twenty years
both tried to reconsider their positions regarding time travel. The discussions about
the possibility of time travel were philosophically enriched with concepts involving
human action, free will, Divine omniscience or personal identity and, above all, logic
of possible worlds. Scientists believe that the would-be QFT will definitely clarify the
problem of the actualisation of CTC in one of the two possible ways: either to provide
the conditions in which they are possible, or to reject them as impossible at least at the
stage before gravity itself is quantized. But if we are to accept this major challenge we
have to reconsider most of our theories of time.
We want to investigate the compatibility between time travel and theories of time
or at least some possible connections between them. There are some assumptions
about time travel that come from theories of time, but it is not clear if time travel
should be accepted they „would remain the same”. We want to place the discussion on
time travel in the context of temporal parts, continuants and occurrences and to prove
that there are strong ontological commitments that cannot be neglected either by the
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philosophers, or by the scientists. Theories of time are not unsympathetic to scientists
as the occurrences-continuants distinction can be found in the important debate
between the reality of particles (defended by K. Popper, A. Landé, etc.) and the reality
of events in modern physics (defended by D. Bohm, J.-P. Vigier, E. Schrödinger and
even A. Einstein). We will briefly present the two theories of time currently in debate
among philosophers and logicians.
A) Four-dimensionalism49 is based on a partial analogy between spatial and
temporal parts. An object is spread in time much as it is spread out in space. The
occupants of each span of time are different and each is a temporal part of the whole.
The whole is a four dimensional object, more precisely a super-object with a
spatiotemporal extension, a „worm”.50 So the four-dimensionalist says that my current
temporal part is atemporally part of the larger space-time „worm” that is my body.
Zemach51 defines four ontologies based on the difference between being
continuos in a certain dimension (having no parts and undergoing change in this
dimension as a whole) and being bound in a certain dimension (having parts along this
dimension and parts having different attributes). The four-dimensionalism is an
„ontology of events” that carves its entities as bound in time and space. These entities
with boundaries in all four dimensions are events, or non-continuants, or processes.
For a four-dimensionalist („first” in Zemach’ classification) the classical three-
dimensional object as continuant can be imagined as a „lazy process”. Only events are
real and only they can be predicated, can have proper names and only they are the
substances of the world.52 For a strong four-dimensionalist reality contains only
processes.
This perspective adopts the atemporal parthood and atemporal exemplification.
Change is only a difference between temporal parts. Saying that x has a property P at t
means simply that x has a temporal part at t that has atemporally P or „the t-part of x
has P”. Temporal properties are carried simpliciter and they are not relative to time.
In the four-dimensionalism proposed by Sider we have attributes like „part of ...
at t” instead of something atemporal, „part of”, that is, a language with mereological
concepts temporally qualified. Sider adopts a more relaxed four-dimensionalism. He
does not suppose that facts about temporal parts are prior to or more fundamental than
facts about continuants and that continuant objects are in any sense constructed from
their temporal parts.53 He doesn’t assert a strong Humean Supervenience that local
                                                
49 The terminology is used in [Van Inwagen, 1990] and recently in [Sider 1997], but we will use as well
other designations as Temporal Part Theory (TPT) for four-dimensionalism and Continuant Theory (CT) for three-
dimensionalism, as they are used in literature e.g. [Zemach, 1970], [Le Poidevin, 2000]. The doctrine of four-
dimensionalism was firstly advocated by Russell Our Knowledge of the External World, 1914, A. N. Whitehead,
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, 1918, R. Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic,
1958 and W. v. O. Quine, Word and Object, 1960.
50 R. Taylor describes the analogies between time and space in „Spatial and Temporal Analogies”, in
Journal of Philosophy, 52(22), 599-612. „Spatially long” is the same and „having a long duration”, there are
temporal places as spatial ones, there exists also temporal movement as spatial movement, etc. and answers to
seven possible objections to these analogies. This paper was strongly criticised by J. Meiland, R. Gale, G.
Schlesinger, J. Butterfield and T. Chapman on various grounds. We will discuss further Chapman’s critique of
analogies between spatial and temporal parts as it is significant to the time travel.
51 [Zemach, 1970, 232-3].
52 [Zemach, 1970, 234].
53 [Sider, 1997, 208]. In an analysis of R. Taylor’ analogies, Meiland shows that there are disanalogies
between temporal parts and spatial parts, like „a spatial part is a set of temporal parts” and „a temporal part is not a
set of spatial parts” [Meiland, 1966, 68] and concludes that „time is prior to space” [Meiland, 1966, 70]. Meiland
advocates temporal parts without accepting all analogies found in Taylor. Schlesinger considers that a world
without time and only with space would be totally stripped of the capacity of containing individuals, whereas a
world devoid of space can sustain a system of particulars of a certain kind (Aspects of Time, 1980, p.18; the
example of a temporal world without space is from Strawson’s Individuals).
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qualities would be instantiated by temporal parts and facts about temporal parts would
determine all facts about identity over time. He says that temporal parts exist (as a
consequence of the „Thesis of Temporal Locality”).54 He separates the problem of
existence of temporal parts from the problem of their priority, reducibility etc.55
Sider’s argument in defence of four-dimensionalism, i.e. the Thesis of Temporal
Locality (TTL), is parallel to Lewis’s argument for the unrestricted mereological
composition, according to which any class of objects whatsoever has a fusion.56
Four-dimensionalism confers great advantages in logic and especially mereology
because it rescues extensional mereology. This model removes the temporal
modification from predicates and builds it into terms. There is no need for tensed
predicates or time indexicals. Four-dimensionalism reformulates ontology in another
language, already familiar to us.57 The new language is more consonant with STR, but
as P. Simons suggests that „the rejection of the old ontology must be postponed until
such time as the promised better alternative is in a more liveable state.”58
We will put stress here on the analogy between spatial and temporal parts because
the most influential philosophical paper about time travel in recent years is Davis
Lewis’ „The Paradoxes of Time Travel”59 where he suggests a connection between
temporal parts and time travel in a clear four-dimensionalist way. But the analogy was
first hinted at by Richard Taylor. We will discuss it and after that the critique of
Chapman.
For Taylor „spatially long” is the same as „having a long duration”, there are
temporal places as spatial ones, there exists also temporal movement as spatial
movement, etc. He answers seven possible objections to these analogies (his paper
was strongly criticised afterwards by J. Meiland, R. Gale, G. Schlesinger, J.
Butterfield and T. Chapman on various grounds). In support of temporal parts theory
he gives an answer to the following objection: „A thing can move back and forth in
space, though it cannot do so in time”.60 Considering the example of a whistle blast
moving in three different towns L1, L2 and L3 as follows:
L1 L2 L3
T1 S1 - S3
T2 - S2
T1 S2, S3
So we can admit that some spatial parts of an „object” can move backward in time.
Chapman shows that we cannot imagine a time travel based only on analogy between
time and space. He criticises Taylor’s concept of movement in time. Movement back
and forth in space is possible at different times. If space and time were analogous, we
could find a state of affairs like the one depicted by Taylor, but there are many
differences, largely commented upon in the philosophical literature. Chapman
                                                
54 Thesis of Temporal Locality in a atemporal form: „Necessarily, for any object, x, and for any non-empty
non-overlapping sets of times T1 and T2 whose union is the time span of x, there are two objects x1 and x2 such
that (i) x is the fusion of x1 and x2 and (ii) the time span x1 = T1, whereas the time span of x2 = T2”. The atemporal
definition of „temporal part” is: „x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df (i) x is a part of y, (ii) x
exists at, but only at t, and (iii) x overlaps every part of y that exists at t.” [Sider, 1997, 206].
55 [Sider, 1997, 208].
56 [Sider, 1997, 214] and [Lewis 1986b, 212-213]. The strong claim proved to support TTL is: „every
assignment has a minimal diachronic fusion”.
57 [Simons, 1987, 123].
58 [Simons, 1987, 127].
59 Published first in American Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1976).
60 [Taylor, 1955, 610].
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considers that Taylor replaces the object with a super-object which is the spatio-
temporal path of the object in time and he cannot use the concept of travel in time
neither about a travel in space, as his conceptual scheme drops the „absolutely
fundamental notion of an object (in our sense) having a velocity”.61 For Taylor motion
is a successive appearance of temporal bits of super-objects.
The spatial analogy doesn’t help us very much in the discussion about time travel
because identity (and reidentification) in time is different from identity in space.
Belonging to a temporal part is different to belonging to a spatial part. Otherwise, it is
clear enough that the analogy between spatial and temporal part can be refuted
without damaging the theoretical basis of four-dimensionalism. This analogy itself is
too weak to stay as the sole ground for this doctrine.
B) Three-dimensionalism defends a contrary position, the one we use most and
that comes almost naturally to us. Things persist through time and they are wholly
present throughout time. The entire object is to be found at each instant of time. There
is a great disanalogy between occupying time and occupying space: spatial part can
exhibit incompatible properties, it doesn’t imply change as we have different
particulars in different places. An object may have completely different properties and
this doesn’t mean it is contradictory. Temporal variations may imply change of one
and the same individual who persists through change.
The strong slogan of three-dimensionalism is: for every x and every t at which x
exists, every part of x exists at t. Sider change it slightly: „x is wholly present at t if
everything that is at any time part of x exists and is part of x at t”.62 He presents some
possible theses of three-dimensionalism, but finally the single thesis acceptable for all
three-dimensionalists is the weaker one: „It is possible that some object is wholly
present at more than one time”.63 Parthood is irreducibly temporally relative and
properties are relative to time.
There are also other ways to state this doctrine. We can express it as follows:
objects are „continuants”64 and „the collection is not a plurality, but a specific kind of
unity”, they have no temporal parts. Things are bound in space and continuous in
time, if we adopt Zemach’s classification: this constitutes the second ontology,
„ontology of things”. An object can be sliced in space, it has spatial boundaries. In
respect of time, a continuant is not „defined”, it has no boundaries. David Lewis
opposes „perduring” to „enduring”: something „perdures iff it persists by having
different temporal parts or stages”.65 Occurrents (in C.D. Broad terminology, or
„events”, „non-continuants”) are very intimately related to time, but in general they
are not clearly located in space; continuants have a direct relation to space and an
indirect one to time.
The mereology of temporary parts of continuants adds a temporal qualified
relation of „being part of … at t” alongside the timeless logical notion of „being part
of” <t and a temporal predicate of existence, temporally modifiable, Exta. This
temporal mereology permits us to convey many classical theorems of mereology in the
language of temporary parts. We can redefine all the concepts from calculus of
                                                
61 [Chapman, 1982, 137].
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that exists for more than an instant ever has a temporal part”, „necessarily, in the actual world small particles are
wholly present throughout their lifetimes”, etc. All these thesis are by necessity. In Sider’s view, there are too
strong for all three-dimensionalists [Sider, 1997, 210-211].
64 W. E. Johnson used for the first time the term of „continuant”. Logic, vol. I, CUP, 1921, p. 200.
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individuals developed by Lesniewski (1916) and Leonard and Goodman (1942) in the
theory of continuants with time: proper part (a <<t b), overlapping (a ot b), binary
product, binary sum, etc. Disjointness can be interpreted in at least three modes, but
we haven’t to enter in details here.66 Much more important is the definition of
mereological constancy and variability (MC and MV):
MCa ≡∀tt’(Ext a ∧ Ext’ a ⊃ ∀x (x <t a ≡ x <t’ a)) and MV a ≡ ~ MC a
which says that an object is mereological constant between two instants if all its
parts that exist at the two instants are identical.
These two theories of time have proponents and disputants. David Lewis rejects
the three dimensionalism and the view of enduring objects. An object endures „iff it
persists by being wholly present at more than one time”. Things endure and they are
timelike streaks. Each object is composed of temporal parts or stages. Change is solely
a difference between temporal parts as are the differences between spatial parts of an
object. Objects can’t change if they have no temporal parts.67 In another terminology,
„occurrent” objects are opposed to „continuant” objects as they have temporal parts
and they endure. „Continuants” have characteristically spatial parts but as well
temporal parts and they perdure.68 Traditionally events are considered as occurrents
and things as continuants. Metaphysicians accept either in a reductionist, or in a
eliminativist manner one of the three alternatives: 1) the world is completely
constituted of continuants, 2) the world is completely constituted of occurrents, or 3)
the world is composed of continuants and occurrents.
Four-dimensionalism can be rejected from a three-dimensionalist point of view on
the basis of next objections: a) parts must be causally identifiable independently of the
wholes they are part of; b) if objects have a temporal parts, then an object existing at
one time cannot literally be identical with an object existing at another; c) temporal
parts presuppose already an ontology, unlike spatial parts; d) if we accept that objects
have temporal parts, the difference between objects and events would collapse; e) on a
temporal parts ontology (e.g. Quine’s) nothing genuinely changes.69 It can be noticed
that b), c) and d) can be rejected on various grounds and in general a) and e) are much
more stimulating for philosophical discussions. There are other arguments against
temporal parts like the logic impossibility of instantaneous parts, „ex nihilo”
existences, time-space analogies and Humean causes.70 We can also reject four
dimensionalism on the basis of a disanalogy between spatial and temporal parts. For
example, Butterfield’s conclusion is that detensers don’t need temporal parts and we
can continue to use our three-dimension intuitions about parts without any danger.71
Van Inwagen rejects temporal part theory on a basis like the paradox of composition
of classes, showing that temporal parts are „modally inductile” (the temporal extents
of a temporal part must belong to their essence) and also the super-object as a whole
must be modally inductile, which is false.72 But in this paper we are not here generally
concerned with arguments against four-dimensionalism.
In our language we accept a combination between four-dimensionalism and three-
dimensionalism. Normally we use temporal parts language only for occurrents and a
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continuants language for describing continuants. The two doctrines can coexist
without problems, as we are using the same language with objects and events as
referents.73 By our intuition we can accept that continuants are parts of occurents and
also we admit that even if the members of a class are continuants, the class can be an
occurrent.74 We can accept that objects have temporal parts as well as spatial parts,
but it depends on the ontological structure of that object. Spatial parts can be divided
without problem into spatial subcomponents, and also into temporal components, too.
But some objects and events have spatial and temporal parts as well. Without
accepting vagueness we can say that the division is dependent of the ontological
complexity of the object or events. World War II had temporal parts as well as spatial
parts. We can also speak without problem of a spatial part of a temporal part (the
Stalingrad battle of the 1943 winter campaign of the Wehrmacht in Russia), as well as
a temporal part of a spatial part („Galerie des Glaces” from Palace of Versailles in
1919). Theoretically the recursion has no limit, we accept second order non-
homogenous relation of parthood, e.g. spatial part of a temporal part of a spatial part
(and all other combinations).75
7) Testing theories of time with time travel
Time travel cannot be refuted only by proving that space and time are different. It
cannot be rejected only on the anthropomorphic claim that it is counter-intuitive and
infringes our outlook of a easily-comprehensible and easily-governed world. As we
already noticed, classical GTR seems incapable to reject it internally and we are not
sure that QFT will help us very much. It is true that time travellers do not invade us as
space travellers do, but this is available only for a „reasonable” range of periods of
time that can be measured and kept under surveillance. Nobody knows if at a small or
at a large time-scale CTC constitutes a possible, or much more, a necessary feature of
the world. Recently physicists have conjectured that singularities and black holes
should be almost everywhere, even in our body, but we haven’t yet detected them. If
time travel is rejected the endeavour of science and philosophy to comprehend the
world should be made easier, the world should be more dull and domestic, but we risk
committing a great fallacy of ignorance. Neither can logic help very much, as the
principles and axioms of classical system of logic cannot be used to reject time travel.
The simplest reason is that the temporal logic we normally use is inspired from natural
language and they are based on the isomorphism between order of temporal entities
and order of real or rational numbers.
The analogy between space and time as well as the isomorphism of time scale
with the real number set are topological questions. The ontological difference between
objects in time cannot be reduced to or deduced from the ontological difference
between objects in space. Perceivability and measurability of CTC are questions
regarding our capacity to measure changes over small or large periods of times, the
constancy of physical laws and constants of physics, history of Universe, etc. It is not
very clear if our clocks and chronometers are not a priori conceived to elude close
times. It is not very clear if we can produce CTC or just use an already existing one.
We haven’t them yet at hand, but we cannot conceive them or describe them
mathematically or even simulate them on computers. Global properties of „Time”
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cannot be inferred from local observations of properties of small periods of times. If
CTC, branching or cyclic time, multidimensional time or forking past are not common
in everyday experience, we cannot infer that they are logically impossible and we
cannot carve „Time” in general.76
Time travel is crying out for a stronger ontological version, regarding the reality
of temporal objects, more exactly the theories involving the reality of objects in time.
We will try now to investigate the possibility to adapt the theories of time to time
travel. If we want to improve their power of expression possibly we have to amend
them. Theories of time in a simplistic form cannot accept time travel completely. It
seems that time travel is partially compatible with both theories of time but it has
many conflicting points. Two remarks are necessary to emphasise this strange
„outlaw” feature of time travel for both three-dimensionalism and four-
dimensionalism.
The first remark concerns the relation of a time traveller to the reality of temporal
objects. The destination of a time traveller is the realm of past objects. How real can
be a past object and a future one? This concerns the ontological aspect of the
tense/tenseless debate. We are not entering here into details but it is worth noting that
beyond the debate about the truth conditions of tense propositions, there is an
ontological problem of reality of things existing in time. Presenteism says that only
present things are real. David Lewis rejects presenteism on the basis of an analogy
between space and time. He asserts that rejecting the reality of past and future is as
hidebound as denying the reality of distant places. The spatial analogy is unimportant
here and can drive us into confusion. We cannot accept presenteism together with
time travel because if something acts upon something it has to be as real as the second
(the problem of impotence of future entities). Time travel seems also incompatible
with the idea of the objective flow of time based on the branching model advocated by
Storrs McCall.77
A Parmenidian outlook in which past, present and future are equally real can
make sense of time travel, while presenteism is at odds with the possibility of time
travel.78 But it would be better to accept degrees of existence (or reality) in time. The
Scholastic view of „degrees of being” can be adapted to the temporal existence. Past
objects exist in a weaker sense than present things and in a stronger sense than future
things. This chain of being can be defined by the relation of causality or „power to act
upon”. The reality of some past and future objects can be differentiated and can be
distinguished by the power of acting one upon other. In some sense this hypothesis
can resolve the grandfather paradox.
Secondly the time machine and its occupant are objects in a full sense, which
means that they are continuants. That happens in grandfather and autoinfanticide
paradoxes when the traveller is trying to kill his grandfather or his younger ego. In
doing so he is acting like a substance wholly present at each stage. This example is
preferred and it is a very shocking one because it involves personal identity, agent and
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free will. As Hume mentioned, we dislike the temporal part theory because we think
of ourselves as continuants, having a personal identity through time and being wholly
present during our lives.79 Classical discussion of time travel doesn’t give up the
continuant theory either in this case. Time traveller is a person and remains a person
during his journey in the past, so he is a special kind of substance, i.e. a continuant.
Even Feynman’s interpretation of positrons as electrons travelling backward in time
and the hypothesis of tachyons as making communication to the past possible are
reliant on a theory of objects as continuants. Tachyons are particles and they can carry
energy and information, so they have attributes and can be defined in an essentialist
way. The examples of laser beams or radio waves carrying information and travelling
backward in time are less discussed. That means that in the time travel „drama”
continuants are more important than occurrents. But continuants are the source of
paradoxes in time travel because their existence as objects at a future time can be
jeopardised by their own existence in the past. We have two solutions: either to
change the time traveller to a wave or to an object less real then a wave or other form
of information carrier, or to consider that the existence of a time traveller can be
described neither as a continuant, nor as an occurrent.
It seems that time travel as a succession of occurrents will raise less problems
than if we allow continuants to travel in time. We can have simultaneously access to
different parts of an occurrent, whereas we cannot different temporary parts of a
continuant. Think of a concert that can be listened to directly or can be delayed
acoustically in time by a special medium. We have access to two distinct part of the
same occurrent. Different temporal parts of the same occurrent can overlap. If we hear
a concert delayed in time and the concert itself we accept them as equally real. We
notice naturally that there is a difference between the entanglement of meeting a
younger ego and the experience of hearing simultaneously a concert and its former
replica, only delayed in time. If a wave is sufficiently coherent it can annihilate itself
in a region of space or time by interference. The auto-annihilation of a wave in time
doesn’t intrigue us or at least it disturbs us less than auto-infanticide. But what about
the delay in time? We can delay occurrents in time but cannot delay continuants in
time. To record the moving image of a person means to access information about a
temporal part of him and this record is less real than the continuant itself because it is
ontologically dependent on it: an object in time can be delayed in time only as image
and by this process the original reality of the object is lost. We cannot accept that two
different temporal parts of an object could stand in almost the same space and have
the same degree of reality. One of them have to be less real. It is clear that a time
journey is itself an occurrent, as it has temporal parts, it is a process and it has phases.
A clear four-dimensionalist tendency affects the scientific description of time travel.
The CTC are worldlines with temporal parts. It is also very important to remark that
the general case is CTC and from it can be derived the evolution on an ordinary
timelike curve as a limit case.
Thirdly there is an important connection between possible world semantics and
time travel which has not been enough discussed. It is clear that a time traveller
coming from w1(t1) who can change the past, i.e he is travelling to the world w0(t0)
and acts upon it, will force the universe to follow another path and to reach another
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future possible world w3(t1) and w1 and w3 can be mutually incompatible. But this
approach is a strong realistic one and it can be rejected on various grounds.#80
In the first sections of this paper it was revealed how time travel occupies a
strange place in our outlook of the world, being atypical for both scientific and
philosophical thought. In the last section we brought to light some difficulties
encountered by the two theories of time to capture fully the reality of time travel.
There is a strong tendency of naturalisation in philosophy today. It is clear that a time
traveller is not as simple as a spatial one and to visit your younger ego cannot be like a
journey to an old aunt in the countryside. If occurrents and continuants can coexist
and can be caught in ordinary language and ordinary thought, an object going through
a CTC is not simply an occurrent or a continuant. It is possible that we have to leave
place for this third type of temporal object, something that isn’t yet present in our
language and cannot be  accommodated with our minds. The presence of a time
traveller can be considered as a third type of existence: he is in a real world but he can
influence no objects in it that are temporal parts of the whole to which he belongs. It
remind us of the difference between quantum particles and macroscopic objects or the
difference between wave and corpuscle. It is better to accept it as a new type of
temporal existence and not to force it into our classical view of occurrent and
continuants.
Ioan-Lucian Muntean*
References
Berger, George, 1968, „The Conceptual Possibility of Time Travel”, British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 19, 152-155.
Bordes Solanas, Montserrat, 1997, „Four-dimensionalist Remarks: A Defence of
Temporal Parts”, Theoria, 12(29), 343-377.
Butterfield, Jeremy, 1985, „Spatial and Temporal Parts”, Philosophical Quarterly, 35,
32-44.
Chapman, T.,  1982, Time: a Philosophical Analysis, Reidel, Dordrecht, London.
Deutsch, David, Lockwood, Michael, 1994, „The Quantum Physics of Time travel”,
Scientific American, 50-56.
Dwyer, Larry, 1975, „Time Travel and Changing the Past”, Philosophical Studies, 27,
341-350.
Earman, John,  1989, World enough and space-time: absolute versus relational
theories of space and time, MIT Press.
Earman, John,  1995a, Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks: Singularities and
Acausalities in Relativistic Spacetimes, Oxford University Press.
Earman, John, 1995b, „Outlawing Time Machines: Chronology Protection
Theorems”, Erkenntnis, 42, 5-19.
Faye, Jan,  1989, The Reality and the Future. An Essay on Time, Causation, and
Backward Causation, Odense University Press.
Grey, William, 1999, „Troubles with Time Travel”, Philosophy, 74, 55-70.
                                                
80 See the debate between William Craig and Robert Merrihew Adams on related subjects in Philosophia
(Israel), vol. 25, (1-4), April 1997, 401-415.
* Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: muntean@fil.unibuc.ro  This paper is the
result of a research scholarship of Romanian Ministry of Education as a visiting scholar at the University of Leeds.
I am very grateful to Katherine Brading, Jeremy Butterfield, John Divers, Robin Le Poidevin, Joseph Melia, Peter
Morgan, William Newton-Smith, Scott Shalkowski and Peter Simons for criticisms which have helped to shape
the paper.
20
Hawking, S. W., Ellis G. F.R., 1973, The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time,
Cambridge University Press.
Hawking, St. W., 1992, „Chronology Protection Conjecture”, Physical Review, D, 46,
603-611.
Horwich, Paul,  1987, Asymmetries in Time, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass..
Kim, S.-W., Thorne, K. S., 1991, „Do vacuum fluctuations prevent the creation of
closed timelike curves?”, Physical Review, D, 43, 3929-3947.
King, David, „Time Travel and Self-Consistency: Implications for Determinism and
the Human Condition”, Ratio, vol. 12, nr. 3, September 1999, 271-278.
Le Poidevin, Robert,  1991, Change, cause and contradiction: a defence of the
tenseless theory of time, Macmillan, London.
Le Poidevin, Robin, 2000, „Continuants and Continuity”, The Monist, (forthcoming).
Lewis, David,  1986a, Philosophical Papers. Vol. II, Oxford University Press.
Lewis, David,  1986b, On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford, Cambridge.
Macbeath, Murray, 1982, „Who Was Dr Who’s Father?”, Synthese, 51, 397-430.
Meiland, J. W., 1966, „Temporal Parts and Spatio-temporal Analogies”, American
Philosophical Quarterly, 3, 64-70.
Putnam, Hilary, 1962, „It Ain’t Necessarily So”, Journal of Philosophy, 59 (22), 658-
671.
Ray, Christopher, 1991, Time, space and philosophy, Routledge, London.
Riggs, Peter J., April, 1997, „The Principal Paradox of Time Travel”, Ratio, X, 48-64.
Savitt, Steven F. (ed.), 1991, Time’s arrows today : recent physical and philosophical
work on the direction of time, Cambridge University Press.
Sider, Theodore, April 1997, „Four-Dimensionalism”, The Philosophical Review,
106(2), 197-231.
Simons, Peter,  1987, Parts: a Study in Ontology, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Simons, Peter, 2000, „Continuants and Occurrents”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, (forthcoming).
Smart, J. J. C., 1963, April, „Is Time Travel Possible?”, Journal of Philosophy, 60,
237-241.
Stein, Howard, „On the Paradoxical Time-structures of Gödel”, Philosophy of
Science,  37, 1970, 589-601.
Taylor, Charles, 1955, „Spatial and Temporal Analogies”, Journal of Philosophy, 52
(22), 599-612.
Van Inwagen, Peter, 1990, „Four-Dimensional Objects”, Noûs, (24), 245-255.
Weingard, R., 1972, „On Travelling Backward in Time”, Synthese, 24, 117-132.
Zemach, E., 1970, „Four Ontologies”, Journal of Philosophy, 67, 231-247.
Zimmerman, Dean, 1997, „Immanent Causation”, Philosophical Perspectives, Mind,
Causation, and World, 11, 433-471.
